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One crucial step in any quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme is parameter estimation. In a typical QKD
protocol the users have to sacrifice part of their raw data to estimate the parameters of the communication
channel as, for example, the error rate. This introduces a tradeoff between the secret key rate and the accuracy of
parameter estimation in the finite-size regime. Here we show that continuous-variable (CV) QKD is not subject
to this constraint as the whole raw keys can be used for both parameter estimation and secret key generation,
without compromising the security. First we show that this property holds for measurement-device independent
(MDI) protocols, as a consequence of the fact that in an MDI protocol the correlations between Alice and Bob
are post-selected by the measurement performed by an untrusted relay. This result is then extended beyond the
MDI framework by exploiting the fact that MDI protocols can simulate device-dependent one-way QKD with
arbitrarily high precision.
Introduction:– Quantum key distribution (QKD) exploits
quantum physics to distribute secret keys between distant
users that have access to an insecure quantum communication
channel [1–4]. These secret keys can then be used as one-time
pads to achieve information-theoretically secure communica-
tion [5]. A QKD protocol is an explicit recipe to achieve this
goal and typically comprises two parts: a quantum part where
quantum signals are transmitted through a quantum channel
connecting two authenticated users (typically named Alice
and Bob) and then measured at the output of the channel; a
classical part where local classical information about the state
preparation and measurement outputs are processed to extract
a common, secret key.
One crucial part of classical post-processing is parameter
estimation, a routine aiming at obtaining information about
the quantum channel connecting Alice to Bob. The task of
parameter estimation is similar to quantum channel (or state)
tomography (see e.g. Ref. [6] and references therein), though
in this case one is not interested in obtaining a full descrip-
tion of the quantum channel, but only in those features that
are relevant for the security of the QKD protocol. Once the
quantum channel is estimated, the principles of quantum me-
chanics impose an upper bound on the amount of information
that has possibly leaked to a potential eavesdropper. In gen-
eral, local information without classical communication is not
sufficient to perform neither parameter estimation nor quan-
tum state tomography [7–9]. For this reason, it is required
that Alice and Bob exchange part of their local data in order
to perform parameter estimation. Obviously, all the classical
data that are communicated through an insecure channel must
be considered compromised. It follows that the more data are
used for parameter estimation, the lower is the final secret key
rate. Viceversa, if less data are used for parameter estimation,
then statistical errors will make the estimation less accurate.
In this Letter we show that for continuous-variable (CV)
QKD protocols (as for example those in Refs. [10–20]) one
can use, without loss of security, the whole local data for both
parameter estimation and secret key extraction. This result is a
consequence of a characteristic features of CV QKD: that the
knowledge of the covariance matrix (CM) of the field quadra-
tures is in general sufficient to assess the security of a CV
QKD protocol [12, 21]. To prove this result we consider the
framework of measurement-device independent (MDI) QKD,
first introduced to achieve security against side-channel at-
tacks on the measurement devices [22, 23]. Then, the result
is extended to one-way CV QKD protocols by exploiting the
fact that the latter can be simulated by an MDI protocol up to
an arbitrarily small error [24].
In previous works, other authors have discussed a way to
use the whole raw keys for both parameter estimation and se-
cret key extraction. This can be achieved if the users first ob-
tain a rough estimate of the error rate (or of the signal-to-noise
ratio) and then exploit it to perform error correction before pa-
rameter estimation [10, 25]. Our approach is independent and
conceptually different as we do not need a rough estimate of
the channel parameters and we do not rely on doing error cor-
rection before parameter estimation.
The structure of a QKD protocol:–Up to a few conceptually
significant advancements, the structure of QKD protocols has
remained mostly constant since the first QKD protocol was
proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84) [26]. A
typical QKD protocol consists of seven basic operations: (1)
State preparation: Alice generates a sequence of n symbols,
for each symbol she prepares a suitable quantum codeword.
For example, in the original BB84 protocol Alice encodes a
bit value X ∈ {0, 1} in one qubit either using the computa-
tional basis {|0〉, |1〉} or the diagonal basis {|+〉, |−〉}. (2)
Communication: The quantum states are transmitted through
an insecure quantum communication channel. (3) Measure-
ment: Bob measures the quantum states coming out of the
communication channel. For example, in the BB84 protocol
Bob obtains a bit value Y ∈ {0, 1} by either measuring in the
computational or diagonal basis. (4) Sifting: For each signal
transmitted, Alice and Bob publicly announce whether they
have employed the computational or diagonal basis. Then
they only retain the data corresponding to matching choices
for preparation and measurement. The sifted data represent
the local raw keys of Alice and Bob. (5) Parameter estima-
tion: Alice and Bob publicly agree on a subset of their local
data to estimate the parameters of the channel. For example,
2Bob sends to Alice a fraction f of his data, so that she can
estimate the probability of error. Obviously, all the data sent
through the public channel for parameter estimation are com-
promised and cannot be used for secret key extraction: the
final rate will thus be reduced by a factor 1− f . (6) Error cor-
rection: Alice sends to Bob error-correcting information. Bob
can combine this informationwith his local data to reconstruct
Alice’s raw keys up to a small error (direct reconciliation). (7)
Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob apply a hash function to
obtain a shorter key which a potential eavesdropper has virtu-
ally no information about.
During the three decades that separate us from BB84, sev-
eral main conceptual development of QKD has been intro-
duced. One of the main advancements in QKD has been the
introduction of CV protocols [27, 28], in which information
is encoded in continuous degrees of freedom of the electro-
magnetic field, e.g., quadrature and phase [3, 29]. In Ref.
[30] it was shown that even semi-classical states as coherent
states can be employed for QKD. Up to 2002, it was believed
that QKD could not possibly work for channel loss above 3
dB. This beliefs was proven wrong in Ref. [31]. Indeed, if it
is Bob to send error correcting information to Alice (reverse
reconciliation [32]) then one can in principle obtain secrecy
in the presence of arbitrary high loss [13, 33–35]. In 2006
it was shown that switching between two different bases for
state preparation and measurement is not necessary for CV
QKD protocols based on coherent state preparation and het-
erodyne detection [11]. Thus with no-switching protocols one
can avoid to sacrifice part of the data during the sifting phase.
Only very recently, MDI QKD has been introduced as a
framework to prevent side-channel attacks on the measure-
ment devices [36, 37]. In fact, in MDI QKD the honest users
are only required to prepare quantum states, but not to mea-
sure them, as the measurement is delegated to an untrusted
relay [22, 23] [38]. In this way one does not need to make any
assumption on the measurement device: a way to guarantee
security against side-channel attacks.
Description of the CV MDI QKD protocol:–CVMDI QKD
plays a central role to show that in CV QKD all the raw data
can be used for both parameter estimation and secret key gen-
eration. Therefore, before proceedings, we need to recall the
details of the CVMDI QKD protocol put forward in Ref. [24].
The security of this protocol was proven in Ref. [24] in the
asymptotic limit, and in Ref. [40] in a finite-size, composable
setting. The protocol, schematically summarized in Fig. 1,
develops in five steps:
1. Coherent states preparation. Alice and Bob locally pre-
pare 2n coherent states, with complex amplitudes de-
noted as α′ = (q′A + ip
′
A)/2 and β
′ = (q′B + ip
′
B)/2
[41]. The local variables X ′ ≡ (q′A, p
′
A) and Y
′ ≡
(q′B, p
′
B) are drawn i.i.d. from zero-mean, circular sym-
metric, Gaussian distributions with variances VA and
VB , respectively.
2. Operations of the relay. The 2n coherent states are sent
to a central relay. For each pair of coherent states re-
FIG. 1: The figure shows the scheme of the CV MDI QKD protocol
of Ref. [24]. Single lines represent bosonic modes, double lines clas-
sical variables. Time flows from left to right. Alice and Bob initially
prepare coherent states by applying displacement operatorsDA,DB
to the vacuum state |0〉, according to the value of their local classical
variables. The coherent states are collected by the relay that, through
some (in principle unknown) physical transformation, outputs a clas-
sical variable Z and gives to Eve quantum side information. Finally,
Alice and Bob apply classical displacement dA, dB , conditioned on
the value of Z, to their local classical variables.
ceived the relay publicly announces a variable Z with
complex value γ = (qZ + ipZ)/2. If the relay is trust-
worthy, it operates a (lossy and noisy) CV Bell detec-
tion [42–44].
3. Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob estimate
the covariance matrix (CM) of the variables
(q′A, p
′
A, q
′
B, p
′
B, qZ , pZ). We remark that the property
of extremality of Gaussian states implies that the
knowledge of the CM is sufficient to assess the security
of the protocol [12, 21].
4. Conditional displacements. Alice and Bob define the
displaced variables X = (qA, pA) and Y = (qB, pB)
as follows:
qA = q
′
A − gq′A(γ) , pA = p
′
A − gp′A(γ) , (1)
qB = q
′
B − gq′B (γ) , pB = p
′
B − gp′B (γ) , (2)
where g⋆, for ⋆ = q
′
A, p
′
A, q
′
B, p
′
B, is an affine function
of γ. The variables X , Y represent the local raw keys
of Alice and Bob, respectively.
5. Classical post-processing. To conclude the protocol,
the raw keys are post-processed for error correction and
privacy amplification.
As a matter of fact, we have defined not just one protocol,
but a whole family of CV MDI QKD protocol: one for each
choice of the affine functions g⋆’s. In particular, the CV MDI
protocol of Ref. [24] is defined for an optimal choice of the
functions g⋆ (which for completeness is derived below).
Parameter estimation with almost no public
communication:– The CV MDI QKD protocol described
above has two main characteristic features. The first is that
Alice and Bob do not apply any measurement: the only mea-
surement is performed by the relay, which is assumed to be
3untrusted. This property defines the protocol as MDI, as we
are not making any assumption on the measurement actually
performed by the relay. The second feature represents the
main contribution of this Letter: the estimation of the CM of
(q′A, p
′
A, q
′
B, p
′
B, qZ , pZ) can be done locally by either Alice
or Bob. Obviously, Alice and Bob know, by definition of
the protocol, the variances of q′A, p
′
A, q
′
B , p
′
B . Also, Alice
can locally estimate the correlation terms 〈q′AqZ〉, 〈q
′
ApZ〉,
〈p′AqZ〉, 〈p
′
ApZ〉, from her local data and from the amplitude
γ = (qZ + ipZ)/2 that have been publicly announced by
the relay [45]. Similarly, Bob can locally estimate 〈q′BqZ〉,
〈q′BpZ〉, 〈p
′
BqZ〉, and 〈p
′
BpZ〉. This implies that all the
entries of the CM of (q′A, p
′
A, q
′
B , p
′
B, qZ , pZ) can be locally
estimate by either Alice or Bob, without the need of public
communication.
We remark that here we do not need to specify the explicit
procedure to obtain the confidence intervals for the estimated
parameters. This can be done in many different ways. For
example, under the additional assumption that the variables
(q′A, p
′
A, q
′
B, p
′
B, qZ , pZ) are Gaussian, one can proceed as de-
scribed in Refs. [40, 46, 47]. Otherwise, one can apply the
statistical analysis of Ref. [10] which does not assume Gaus-
sianity. In either case the required data for the estimation of
the correlation terms are all locally available to the users.
Finally, the CM of (qA, pA, qB, pB) can be computed
directly from the CM of (q′A, p
′
A, q
′
B, p
′
B, qZ , pZ) by ex-
ploiting the relations (1)-(2). In conclusion, the CM of
(qA, pA, qB, pB) can be estimated only exploiting locally
available information since, as we show in the following sec-
tion, the functions g⋆ can be also computed from local data
only. This is ultimately possible because in an MDI QKD
the correlations between Alice’s and Bob’s raw keys are post-
selected by the relay. Therefore, the public variable Z con-
tains all the information about the correlations between Alice
and Bob and is thus sufficient, together with the local data, to
estimate the CM.
Optimal conditional displacements:– For completeness we
now derive the optimal choice for the displacement functions
g⋆ [48]. At the parameter estimation stage, Alice and Bob
locally estimate the CM of (q′A, p
′
A, q
′
B , p
′
B, qZ , pZ):
VA′B′Z =

 VAI 0 cAZ0 VBI cBZ
c
T
AZ c
T
BZ vZ

 , (3)
where I denotes the two-dimensional identity matrix,
vZ =
(
〈q2Z〉 〈qZpZ〉
〈qZpZ〉 〈p
2
Z〉
)
(4)
is the empirical CM of (qZ , pZ), and
cAZ =
(
〈q′AqZ〉 〈q
′
ApZ〉
〈p′AqZ〉 〈p
′
ApZ〉
)
, cBZ =
(
〈q′BqZ〉 〈q
′
BpZ〉
〈p′BqZ〉 〈p
′
BpZ〉
)
(5)
are the correlation terms.
We remark that the variables (q′A, p
′
A, q
′
B, p
′
B) are uncorre-
lated with known variances VA, VB by definition of the pro-
tocol, while all the entries involving the publicly known vari-
ables (qZ , pZ) must be estimated from the data.
The optimal choice for the displacements in Eqs. (1)-(2) is
the one that minimizes the correlations between Alice’s and
Bob’s variables and γ = (qZ + ipZ)/2. Therefore we put, for
⋆ = q′A, p
′
A, q
′
B, p
′
B ,
g⋆(γ) = u⋆ qZ + v⋆ pZ , (6)
and require that u⋆ and v⋆ are chosen in such a way that
〈qZqA〉 = 〈pZqA〉 = 〈qZpA〉 = 〈pZpA〉 = 0 , (7)
〈qZqB〉 = 〈pZqB〉 = 〈qZpB〉 = 〈pZpB〉 = 0 , (8)
which implies
〈⋆ qZ〉 = u⋆ 〈q
2
Z〉+ v⋆〈qZpZ〉 , (9)
〈⋆ pZ〉 = u⋆ 〈qZpZ〉+ v⋆〈p
2
Z〉 . (10)
Solving for u⋆ and v⋆ we obtain
u⋆ =
〈⋆ qZ〉〈p
2
Z〉 − 〈⋆ pZ〉〈qZpZ〉
〈p2Z〉〈q
2
Z〉 − 〈qZpZ〉
2
, (11)
v⋆ =
〈⋆ pZ〉〈q
2
Z〉 − 〈⋆ qZ〉〈qZpZ〉
〈q2Z〉〈p
2
Z〉 − 〈qZpZ〉
2
. (12)
With this choice of the parameters u⋆, v⋆ the displaced
variables (qA, pA, qB, pB) are independent of (qZ , pZ). We
remark that in this way the CM VAB of (qA, pA, qB, pB)
equals the conditional CM of (q′A, p
′
A, q
′
B, p
′
B) conditioned on
(qZ , pZ) (see Ref. [24]).
As an example, put VA = VB = 2N and suppose that the
relay applies a Gaussian transformation that consists of (see
Ref. [24]): first attenuating the signals from Alice and Bob by
an attenuation factor η; and then perform an ideal, noiseless,
CV Bell detection. In this case one obtains:
− uq′
A
= vp′
A
= uq′
B
= vp′
B
=
N
ηN + 1/2
√
η
2
. (13)
Other numerical examples are discussed in Ref. [40].
From MDI to one-way CV QKD:– In the MDI framework,
Alice and Bob send quantum states to a central relay, which
is untrusted and possibly operated by an eavesdropper. On the
other hand, in a one-way QKD protocol, Alice sends a quan-
tum state ρ to the receiver Bob, who measures it, typically by
homodyne or heterodyne detection, as shown in Fig. 2(1).
First of all, an MDI protocol can simulate with arbitrary
high precision any one-way protocol. In fact, if the relay is
given to Bob, he can use it to teleport the signals from Alice
into his lab, as shown in Fig. 2(2). Clearly, ideal CV tele-
portation requires Bob to employ as teleportation resource a
two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state ψTMSV with infi-
nite squeezing [42–44] . Otherwise, for any finitely squeezed
TMSV state, the scheme in Fig. 2(2) simulates that in Fig.
4FIG. 2: The figures show: (1) direct heterodyne detection; and (4)
MDI-inspired detection, obtained when the relay is given to the re-
ceiver Bob. Single lines indicate bosonic modes, double line classi-
cal variables. (2) and (3) show intermediate configurations that we
exploit to prove the equivalence, up to an arbitrarily small error, be-
tween (1) and (4). Notice that in (4) we have described the prepa-
ration of a coherent state |β〉 of amplitude β as the application of
a displacement D′ on the vacuum, where the amplitude of the dis-
placement is determined by a classical variable β.
2(1) with up to additive Gaussian noise [49–53]. Since the
displacement operation commutes with heterodyne detection,
to apply a displacement D and then measure by heterodyne
detection [as in Fig. 2(2)] is equivalent to first measure and
then displace the (classical) outcome of the measurement [as
in Fig. 2(3)]. Finally, it is well known that measuring by het-
erodyne detection one mode of an entangled pair in a TMSV
state, conditionally prepares the other mode in a coherent state
[35], this implies the equivalence between the schemes in Fig.
2(3) and Fig. 2(4). In conclusion, the MDI protocol in Fig.
2(4) can simulate the one-way CV QKD. If the complex am-
plitude β is sampled from a Gaussian distribution with finite
variance VB , then one simulates a noisy version of the QKD
protocol, whereas the noiseless case is obtained in the limit
that VB →∞.
Discussion:– As shown above, parameter estimation in CV
MDI QKD can be performed with almost no public commu-
nication because correlations are post-selected by the cen-
tral relay. This condition is necessary but would not be
sufficient without the additional property that in CV QKD
the knowledge of the CM of the quadratures is sufficient to
asses the security of the protocol. In particular, the condi-
tional probability distribution P (XY |Z), which is the rele-
vant quantity for assessing the security of the protocol [22],
can be estimated from the elements of the CM alone. In other
words, the knowledge of the marginal probability distributions
P (XZ), P (Y Z) is sufficient to know P (XY Z). This is the
property that we have exploited above.
It is meaningful to ask whether one can perform parameter
estimation without public communication also in the case of
discrete-variable MDI QKD. The answer to this question is
negative because, although correlations are still post-selected
by the relay, the knowledge of the marginals is no longer suf-
ficient to characterize the protocol. Consider for example the
qubit MDI protocol of Ref. [23], which can be viewed as
an MDI version of BB84, where the variables X and Y as-
sume values in {0, 1}, and Z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} is the output of
qubit Bell detection. One can easily check that in this setting
the marginal probability distributions P (XZ), P (Y Z) do not
uniquely determine P (XY Z).
Conclusions:– The list of conceptual breakthroughs in the
history of QKD includes the discoveries that reverse recon-
ciliation allowed to beat the 3dB barrier, that coherent states
were suitable for QKD despite being semiclassical, and that
CV QKD did not require switching between different bases
for encoding and measurement, thus allowing us to skip the
sifting phase.
This Letter presents one new conceptual development of
CVQKD, namely that the whole raw keys can be used for both
parameter estimation and secret key extraction. This finding
removes the tradeoff between secret key rate and accuracy of
the parameter estimation in the finite-size regime of QKD.
Unlike other works [10, 25], here we do not need an initial
rough estimate of the signal-to-noise ratio nor we require to
perform error correction before parameter estimation.
Such a property is first obtained for CV MDI QKD pro-
tocols as a consequence of the fact that correlations between
Alice and Bob are encoded in the variable that is publicly an-
nounced by the relay — even though such a variable does not
contain information about the secret key. Since CVMDIQKD
can simulate one-way CV QKD protocols with arbitrary pre-
cision, it then follows that the whole raw key can be used for
both parameter estimation and secret key generation for this
class of CV protocols as well.
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